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Ladies and gentlemen, 
 
Pensions and pension systems are controversial in most countries – at 
least if there is talk of changing them. In few countries have they been 
as controversial as in Sweden. Admittedly, the Swedish basic national 
pension was introduced without political controversy just before 
World War I. But controversy raged in connection with the 
introduction of the national supplementary pension scheme 40 years 
ago. 
 
In 1957, after several years of investigations and political discussions, 
a referendum was held on the supplementary pension scheme; there 
were three alternatives, and none of them was backed by a majority of 
the electorate. The year after, the first extra general election ever was 
held in Sweden and the pension question split the coalition between 
the Social Democratic Party and the Centre Party. The year after that 
the proposal put forward by the Social Democrats and the 
Communists in the referendum was adopted with the smallest possible 
margin and with the help of a Liberal abstention. 
 
The supplementary pension scheme (the so-called ATP) was 
introduced in 1960. Ever since the introduction of the basic pension 
the age of retirement was 67, and this was not changed until the mid-
1970s. With the occasional exception, pensions did not rank high on   2
the political agenda in the next few decades. One reason was that the 
non-socialist parties, having burnt their fingers on the supplementary 
pension issue, were reluctant to challenge the system that was 
subsequently introduced. Another reason was the general feeling that 
pension systems are not something that should be changed in a hurry. 
To active members of the Social Democratic Party, the supplementary 
pension scheme was the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the welfare society 
created by their party and the pension showdown was something to 
talk about around their campfires. 
 
So much for the famous Swedish tradition of consensus decisions! 
 
Several times since the agreement about the new pension system was 
reached I have been asked to talk about how to reform a pension 
system and about the lessons that can be learned from the Swedish 
experience. Every time I have felt a reluctance about doing it. This is 
not because I don’t like talking about pensions and the Swedish 
Pension Reform , but because I am genuinely uncertain about what 
one country can learn from another country’s decision-making process. 
 
This is because of the great variation between countries when it comes 
to the political tradition of decision-making, the size of the parties, the 
nature of the differences between the parties, the strength of 
management and labour, the extent to which management and labour 
have any significant practical responsibility for the system and so on. 
 
As regards the content of reforms I think we have much more to learn 
from each other, and of course I hope that there is something in the 
Swedish Pension Reform that may be useful when reforms are 
discussed in other countries. 
 
Given my views about what you can and cannot learn from other 
people’s mistakes and successes, I will now talk both about how we 
carried out the Swedish reform and what principles are underlying it. 
 
Let me first finish off my résumé of the history of our pension reform. 
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The national supplementary pension scheme was, with a few initial 
exceptions, compulsory. It was a pay-as-you-go system. However, the 
pension funds which were created were rather large for a PAYG- 
system. The scheme was introduced in such a way as to allow the 
older members of the workforce to enter the system quite fast 
although they had not paid contributions for any length of time. 
 
The system was financed by payroll taxes. To start with, contributions 
were payable in relation to earnings higher than the basic pension and 
up to a level that today would be the equivalent of a monthly salary of 
2,400 dollars. Later, contributions were paid as a percentage of total 
income, even if this exceeded that limit.  
 
The pension rights earned were proportionate to the contributions paid 
in up to the ceiling, apart from the fact that the qualifying period was 
only 30 years and the size of the pension was calculated on the basis 
of the 15 years with the highest earnings. A simpler way to put this is 
that 30 years’ earnings were sufficient to receive a full supplementary 
pension, which meant that contributions paid for years that employees 
worked more than 30 years did not increase their pensions. The 
persons insured received no information about the status of their 
pension rights. 
 
From the start the link between contributions and benefits was not 
very strong. And almost all the changes that were made during the 
first 20-30 years had the effect of further weakening this link. For 
example, a supplement was introduced for those who only received 
the basic pension and this was gradually increased until it represented 
as much as 50 per cent of the basic pension. This was set off in its 
entirety against any supplementary pension rights earned, which 
naturally meant that for people with low pensions the supplementary 
pension was considered worthless up to an amount equivalent to the 
supplement. The rather generous means-tested housing supplement for 
old-age pensioners was also gradually increased, with much the same 
effect. 
 
The retirement age was lowered to 65. Nevertheless, the number of 
early retirees doubled between 1970 and 1990. And as I mentioned   4
before, contributions also became payable on income which did not 
earn any pension rights. 
 
The supplementary pension scheme was designed at the end of the 
1950s. The annual rate of growth during the previous decade was 
three to four per cent per year. It was therefore understandable  –  
although not excusable –  that the calculations for the scheme 
basically assumed high future growth. Naturally, those who designed 
the scheme were aware that an unusually large number of children 
were born in Sweden, as in many other industrial countries, at the end 
of the war – the ‘baby boomers’. But they would start to draw their 
pensions 50 years after the introduction of the new scheme. Life 
expectancy was increasing, it is true, but the rate of increase was fairly 
modest. Nobody predicted the rapid growth in life expectancy that has 
occurred in the last two decades. 
 
In the early 1980s Sweden ran into severe economic problems, partly 
as a result of the two oil price shocks. Unemployment was unusually 
high. The Swedish currency was devalued in one of these years by 25 
per cent. Many people became concerned about the financial 
sustainability of the pension scheme in the long run. 
 
An official commission of inquiry was set up. (During the latter half 
of the commission’s mandate I was the Liberal representative on it.) 
Its main result was an agreement to very slowly phase out the system 
of widow’s pensions. Apart from that, the Pensions Commission was 
unable during its six years to agree on any major changes, although 
many useful analyses were carried out. These analyses indicated that 
something needed to be done.  
 
One reason – perhaps the most important one – why agreement was 
not reached on any other major changes was undoubtedly the fact that 
after a few years the recession gave way to an economic upswing that 
was followed by a boom lasting several years, with a very low 
unemployment rate. The vague feeling that something should be done 
before the big generation that was born in the middle of the forties 
retired around 2010 evaporated. The Commission’s final report,   5
including its analyses, was circulated during a very long review 
process that drew out past the election in the early autumn of 1991. 
 
The result of the election was that Sweden got a new government 
consisting of the country’s four non-socialist parties. I was appointed 
Minister for Health and Social Security. One of the new government’s 
ambitions was to reform the pension system and to seek to do so in a 
spirit of political consensus, i.e. at least together with the large Social 
Democratic Party. 
 
There were considerable differences between the political parties even 
in the new non-socialist government. The supplementary pension 
scheme was a pet Social Democratic project, and the party was 
strongly opposed to premium pensions. The largest non-socialist party, 
the Moderate Party, wanted to reduce the scope of the mandatory 
pension system and to introduce a premium pension component. The 
Centre Party had long advocated a system with guaranteed basic 
security, which meant substantially raising the level of the basic 
pension, but they also wanted a premium pension component. The 
Christian Democrats wanted to raise the basic pension and to have a 
premium pension component. My own party, the Liberal Party, 
wanted to strengthen the link between contributions and benefits, and 
it also wanted a premium pension component.  
 
Terms of reference were quickly drafted for a commission of inquiry –  
in practice a working and negotiating group –  the Working Group on 
Pensions. The seven parties that were then represented in Parliament 
were invited to take part in this work. Nine politicians from the seven 
parties met for the first time in the Working Group shortly before 
Christmas. 
 
A very unusual feature for a Swedish commission of inquiry was the 
fact that it was chaired by the responsible minister. The other parties 
in government also appointed high-ranking politicians to the Group. 
The large opposition party, the Social Democrats, had two 
representatives. One of these was the outgoing Minister for Social 
Affairs and the other the outgoing Under-Secretary of State. The 
former is once again the minister responsible for pensions. The latter    6
replaced me as Minister and is since several years Director of our 
National Social Insurance Board.  Some of the country’s leading 
pension experts were employed by the Working Group. 
 
Another unusual feature was that neither the employers’ nor the 
employees’ organizations nor organizations representing old-age 
pensioners were included in the group. This naturally gave rise to 
protests. 
 
I organized the inquiry on the basis of my personal experience of 
several years of political activity, both at the regional level in the 
county of Stockholm and as participant in several official inquiries 
and negotiating assignments, including an inquiry on freedoms and 
rights, negotiations on a the traffic system in Greater Stockholm, 
negotiations on care of the elderly and the National Pensions 
Commission. 
 
The lessons I learned from these experiences were: 
-  the importance of having a very clear direction,  
-  the importance of high-level participants, 
-  the importance of great intellectual openness between the 
participants, 
-  the importance of having a limited number of people in the room 
and, perhaps the most important of all, 
-  the importance of not having anyone in the room who is there just 
to watch the negotiators. 
 
It may be mentioned that, as is usually the case in Sweden, a large 
number of representatives of trade unions, employers’ organizations 
and old-age pensioners’ organizations had served on the previous 
pensions commission. Obviously, the task of these representatives was 
to present the views of their organizations and keep track of any 
agreements that might emerge between the representatives of the 
political parties. And, where such agreements conflicted with the 
views or interests of their own organization, to oppose them, both in 
and outside the meeting room. 
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Instead, the new Working Group on Pensions invited representatives 
of the various organizations to special meetings to present their views. 
 
I mentioned that there should be a clear direction. I purposely use the 
word direction rather than objective to indicate a somewhat less 
ambitious approach than that suggested by the word objective. 
 
To get down to specifics, the concise terms of reference for the 
Working Group on Pensions contained very few items. These items 
had deliberately been chosen as being of interest to several members 
of the new government and also because they partly coincided with  
ideas set forth in the last budget statement of the outgoing government. 
They were mainly about making the pension system more sustainable 
and strengthening the link between contributions and benefits, thus 
reducing tax wedges and encouraging people to save more.  
 
The question of premium pensions was not raised at this stage, since it 
was seen as a difficult hurdle that would have to be negotiated if and 
when an agreement was in sight. 
 
One of my personal aims, apart from making sure that the system was 
sufficiently robust in economic and political terms to withstand the 
anticipated strains, was to strengthen the link between contributions 
and benefits as far as possible. I had for many years been convinced 
that the 30-year qualifying period and calculation of the pension on 
the basis of the 15 years of highest earnings not only created 
substantial tax wedges but were also wrong from the point of view of 
income distribution.  
 
The previous Pensions Commission had considered increasing the 
qualifying period to 40 years and taking the 20 years of highest 
earnings into account, but it was forced to withdraw these proposals in 
the face of criticism from groups which thought they might lose by 
such changes, in particular white-collar workers’ organizations. The 
main argument used by these organizations was, incidentally, that 
such a change would be unfavourable to women. 
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My inclination was thus to try to forge a much stronger link between 
contributions and benefits, leaving the negotiating situation to 
determine how much progress could be made in this direction. On the 
face of it, a classic example of reformism. In the event, however, I 
decided that it was worthwhile trying to gain acceptance for the most 
radical principle rather than trying to build a consensus on a limited 
increase  - say from 15 to 25 and from 30 to 35 years. The reason for 
this was that I felt that it might in fact be easier to sell a new principle 
–  ‘every penny counts’ – than to propose small changes which would 
allow the losers to fight each change without having to produce any 
arguments on matters of principle. Today I believe that some Social 
Democrats had arrived at a similar conclusion at the same time as me. 
 
In the Working Group we decided together not for the first few 
months to represent and argue the convictions of our parties but to 
listen and talk to several of the country’s leading pension experts. 
Only after this preliminary phase did the real discussions between the 
representatives of the various parties begin in earnest. 
 
After quite a short time we agreed, when discussing the rules on the 
earning of pension rights, surprisingly enough to apply the principle 
that every crown should count. Reasons would have to be given for 
any departure from this rule, and reasons would also have to be given 
for any modifications on the grounds of income distribution policy.  
 
Thus, with very little struggle, the principle of lifelong earnings was 
born. Later this principle came to be known in English as the Notional 
Defined Contribution (NDC).  
 
Our draft proposal of the summer of 1992 was probably the first time 
the principle was presented in a political document. The idea had been 
proposed by some Swedish economists in 1990 and 1991. The 
structure of some of the negotiated pension schemes that were set up 
in France after the war is said to have some similarities, although I 
very much doubt that any of the Swedish experts and politicians in the 
Working Group was aware of that. 
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In the international debate during the last years the idea of having an 
unfunded system based on the principle that “every penny counts” 
have been considered as a completely new idea. Maybe it was. But I 
can say that we in the Working Group did not feel it so extremely 
innovative as it is nowadays sometimes described. The idea 
sometimes seems to be easier to describe to the general public than to 
pension experts.   
 
A part of implementing the principle of life income was changing the 
system of a basic pension for all, that was introduced in 1913, to a 
system of guarantee pension. The new principle meant that the 
majority should earn their pension rights and thereby diminish the tax 
wedges. 
 
Apart from the basic principle, the draft was characterized by: 
-  a system that was linked to the economy, 
-  transitional rules covering three cohorts (born before 1938, between 
1938 and 1953, and after 1953), 
-  differences of opinion on the funded component, and  
-  differences of opinion on the payment of contributions on earnings 
that do not earn pension rights (the ‘benefit ceiling’). 
 
The draft was presented at a very well-attended press seminar a few 
weeks before the Swedish currency came under pressure and was later 
allowed to float. For several months, under the pressure of the 
economic crisis, the main protagonists had little time – and perhaps 
little mental energy – for the pension reform. 
 
To the surprise of almost everyone, an agreement was reached in 
January 1994 between the four parties of the Government and the 
Social Democratic Party, which together represented about 85 per cent 
of Parliament, on a thoroughgoing pension reform, indeed much more 
thoroughgoing than very few had predicted. 
 
Its main elements were: 
-  the lifelong earnings principle and pension rights, inter alia, for 
parents who stay at home to care for small children, 
-  contributions of 18.5 per cent of wages,   10
-  pensions (and the benefit ceiling) linked to wages instead of prices, 
-  pensions linked to life expectancy (up to the date of retirement), 
-  a minimum guaranteed pension instead of the basic pension, 
-  a premium pension component, which in the agreement was fixed at 
two per cent, 
-  a fifty per cent reduction of contributions above the benefit ceiling, 
-  pensions could be drawn on a flexible basis from the age of 61, 
-  the raising in law of the right to work from 65 to 67years, 
-  annual information to all wage-earners on their pension rights, 
including a forecast, 
-  annual pensions fixed with reference to remaining life expectancy, 
plus an imputed real rate of return of 1.6 per cent, and 
-  step-by-step implementation over three cohorts. 
 
The level of contributions was a result of compromise. The Moderate 
Party wanted a lower level and the Social Democrats a higher level. 
The agreement means that a change to another level will require a new 
agreement between the five parties. Most parties seem to think that the 
level will not be changed. If the level is to be changed, it will only 
concern the new pension rights. Such a decision will also require some 
changes in the balancing mechanism.  
 
After a rather short review process Parliament adopted the bill at the 
beginning of the summer, a few months before the elections in 
September which returned the Social Democrats to power. Before the 
elections an Implementation Group was set up by the five parties that 
were responsible for the reform for the task of implementing and 
sustaining the reform. The chairperson was to be the minister 
responsible for social security. This was the first time in Sweden that 
such an arrangement was made in connection with an agreement 
across party lines. 
 
During the years that have passed since the agreement of 1994, all the 
details and changes in the system have been implemented in 
agreement. The group has not always been in complete harmony, but 
agreement has been reached and, with one or two exceptions, the 
reform is now complete. 
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The premium pension component has been raised to 2.5 per cent of 
earnings. The design has later been imitated by some of the largest 
negotiated pension schemes. Over 90 per cent of Swedish wage-
earners are covered by such schemes. Both private sector employees 
and local government employees can now invest about 3.5 per cent of 
their pay in mutual funds, which means that about 6 per cent of their 
earnings are invested in such funds. This group represents about two 
million members of the workforce of some 4.5 million. 
 
A significant innovation compared with the 1994 reform is the 
automatic balancing mechanism, which acts as a brake or accelerator 
depending on the circumstances. The reason for introducing this 
mechanism is that, although the system was designed in accordance 
with actuarial principles, it was in certain respects probably - almost 
certainly - more generous than a strict actuarial system. For one thing, 
the previous supplementary pension scheme was not immediately 
replaced by the new system but as mentioned only on a step-by-step 
basis. Second, changes in life expectancy are not taken into account 
after a person has retired. Third, pensions and pension rights are 
adjusted upwards to keep pace with changes in per capita wages  
rather than with changes in the total wage sum. 
 
As a result of these three factors, the new system will lose some of its 
stability, that is if life expectancy continues to increase and per capita 
wage growth is faster than total wage growth.  
 
The purpose of the balancing mechanism is as follows. Where the 
ratio between assets and liabilities/pension rights – a ‘critical value’ 
that should ideally be 1.00 – develops in a way that is unfavourable 
for the system, normal indexation is suspended until the balance 
between assets and liabilities – the ‘normal’ level – is restored. On the 
other hand, where the critical value is very positive, another 
mechanism will increase pensions and pension rights more rapidly 
than the normal indexation based on per capita wage growth. The 
design of this mechanism is planned to be finalized by 2004. 
 
At present, the assets consist of the year’s contribution revenue (about 
SEK 145 billion) multiplied by the average length of time the   12
contributions remain in the system (about 32.5 years), added to the 
existing funds (about SEK 525 billion), or about SEK 5.250 billion 
altogether. Current liabilities are estimated at just over SEK 5,000 
billion. Calculations made in November last year are more positive 
than was thought earlier, indicating a value of 1.03 for next year. The 
main alternative at present indicate that the value during the period up 
to the year 2050 will not fall under 1.00. In that case the “brake” will 
not be necessary. 
 
Almost the only part of the reform that is not yet complete is the 50 
per cent reduction of contributions above the benefit ceiling by means 
of contribution switching or tax switching. The pension contribution 
paid by employees, which under the agreed system is to be half of 
18.5 per cent (which amounts in practice to about 8.5 per cent of the 
employee’s wages) is currently 7.0 per cent. Prior to 1993 employees 
paid no individual pension contributions. 
 
The four most unusual features of the new pension system are 
probably: 
-  the strict application of the lifelong earnings principle, 
-  the link to pay and life expectancy, 
-  the premium pension component, and 
-  the automatic balancing mechanism. 
 
The first three were approved by Parliament from the start, in the 
summer of 1994, and the last was approved last spring. The lifelong 
earnings principle was originally controversial, but many opponents 
were won over by the force of the logic behind it. Furthermore, the 
Working Group managed to demonstrate that this principle, together 
with eligibility for pension rights for childcare years, did not mean 
that women’s pensions were lower in relation to men than in the 
previous system. 
 
This was a surprise to many people. The main explanation is that what 
women gained from the short 30-year qualifying period under the 
previous system was offset by the built-in advantage that men have on 
account of the calculation of the pension on the basis of the 15 years 
of highest earnings, since men’s pay still tends to rise more sharply   13
than women’s. We therefore made sure that the pension rights earned 
for childcare years meant that the new system, despite its stricter rules, 
did not penalize women in comparison with the previous system. 
 
Another factor that helped us was the fact that the Swedish 
Confederation for Employees with University Education was basically 
in favour of the lifelong earnings principle, which its chief economist 
had advocated as early as 1990. As a result, few protests were heard 
from graduate employees. 
 
The confederation of whitecollar employees, however, was very 
critical and would probably have preferred to continue with the 
previous qualifying rules, but it devoted more and more of its energy 
to ensuring that pension rights were earned for higher education. Such 
rights were indeed provided, although only to a limited extent. 
 
The situation in the largest trade union organization, the Swedish 
Trade Union Confederation which organizes bluecollar workers, was 
more complicated. Its largest affiliated federation, the Swedish 
Municipal Workers’ Union, sympathized with the proposed reforms. 
The Union has a large majority of female members and is by far the 
largest Swedish organization for women. An important reason for its 
position was probably its realization that low-paid women as a group 
benefit from a good mandatory pension system and their acceptance of 
the analysis that the 30-year rule, not to mention the 15-year rule, was 
not to the advantage of the majority of its members. 
 
Some of the affiliated federations were very critical, particularly the 
ones that organize industrial workers. The reason for this was 
apparently that their members hitherto often had been unable to work 
past the age of 55-60 and would not therefore be favoured by a system 
that focuses strongly on the number of years spent at work. There was 
also concern about a risk for less generous rules for early retirement. 
Perhaps this was the real cause of their dissatisfaction, since the then 
existing supplementary pension scheme did not pay out old-age 
pensions before the age of 60 either. Pensions were then adjusted 
strictly in accordance with actuarial rules, which meant that the annual   14
pension for a person who retired at the age of 60 instead of 65 then 
was 30 per cent lower for the rest of his life. The new rules are similar. 
 
Given the differences of opinion in the Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation, the organization was obviously not in a position to 
vigourously attack the new system. 
 
The employers were generally in favour of the new system, in 
particular its basic principles. They criticized the fact that 
contributions were still payable on earnings that did not generate 
pension rights and that wage indexation instead of price indexation of 
pension rights could prove costly for the system. 
 
Apart from this criticism from employers, however, the change from 
price indexation to wage indexation was probably the feature that 
aroused least criticism. The adjustment for life expectancy did not 
give rise to many objections either. 
 
But the premium pension did give rise to serious conflicts. There was 
strong opposition among many Social Democrats to this idea. Despite 
the fact that the party leadership under the previous – and future  –  
prime minister approved the agreement at the start of 1994, serious 
attempts were made internally for several years to persuade the party 
to tear up the agreement with the non-socialists and instead implement 
minor reforms together with other parties, the Left Party in particular. 
These attempts failed, however, although they considerably delayed 
the implementation. 
 
Finally, there has been some criticism of the proposed automatic 
balancing mechanism. This comes mainly from some of the influential 
old-age pensioners’ organizations, which regard it as a way of 
undermining pensions without politicians having to take responsibility 
for it. In the public debate, and also at a hearing in Parliament last 
spring, they have refused, however, to answer the question whether 
they would prefer to replace the balancing mechanism by indexation 
to the total wage sum and link not only future pensions, but also 
ongoing pension payments, to changes in life expectancy. The 
proposal has also been criticized on the grounds that it only contains   15
draft legislation on the negative aspect of balancing, while the rules on 
‘acceleration’ will only be presented in three years or so. 
 
While we are on the subject of the balancing mechanism, I must admit 
that we in the Implementation Group could have explained it better. 
We should have made it clear that it is an alternative to other changes 
in the rules and that retaining the agreed rules and introducing the 
balancing mechanism will in all probability result in higher pension 
levels than if the rules were changed without applying the mechanism. 
Nor have we succeeded in making it clear that the alternative we 
propose probably ensures greater equity between the generations than 
the use of a total wage growth index. Despite these shortcomings in 
our presentation of the proposals, Parliament has recently adopted 
them. 
 
As I have already mentioned, the balancing mechanism was not a part 
of the agreement of 1994. In my opinion it is a very valuable 
contribution to the reform – and to the international debate on 
pensions. 
 
I am often asked what the greatest threat to the pension reform was. 
There have been many threats to the reform since we prepared it at the 
end of 1991. One serious threat was – I believe – that the original 
agreement was reached less than eight months before the 1994 
election at a time when the Social Democratic opposition had had very 
high ratings in the polls for over a year. There must therefore have 
been a great temptation not to conclude an agreement with the arch 
enemy that would lead to radical changes in the Social Democrat 
welfare state and instead wait until they were in power again. But the 
leadership resisted this temptation. 
 
The most serious threat was probably during a few years in the mid-
1990s, when there existed a tacit unholy alliance between Social 
Democrat activists who thought that pensions would be too low and 
experts at the Ministry of Finance, who thought that pensions would 
be too high. This threat was averted too. 
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As regards income-related pensions, there are great similarities 
between the Swedish reform and one of the three pension reforms 
decided in Italy in the 1990s –  the Dini reforms of 1995. Two 
differences are that the changeover to the new system in Italy will be 
much slower and changes in life expectancy will not be taken into 
account annually but only after discussions once every 10 years. The 
similarities also include the idea of adding in the imputed real growth 
rate during retirement when the annual pension is first calculated. 
 
The Swedish reform has influenced reforms of pension systems in 
other countries. This is perhaps most apparent in the case of Latvia in 
1995 and in Poland in 1997, but some other countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe have also been influenced. The most obvious 
difference between the Swedish reform and reforms in Latvia and 
Poland is the difference in the premium pension component. It is 
much larger in the systems adopted in Latvia and Poland.  
 
One reason for this is that there was a much greater need of funding in 
the Latvian and Polish pay-as-you-go systems than in the Swedish 
national supplementary pension scheme, which still had substantial 
assets thanks to the large volume of earned pension rights that had not 
yet been paid out. 
 
In the first half of my talk I commented on some important features of 
our reform process. I also mentioned that I am uncertain as to how 
much a country can learn from reform processes in other countries. To 
dwell for a moment on this rather destructive aspect, I would like to 
mention that I am convinced that we were lucky, not least as regards 
the parties’ choices of representatives on the Working Group on 
Pensions. Myself excluded of course. 
 
The people who concluded the agreement proved to be exceptionally 
well-suited in seeking and finding a broad consensus, despite the fact 
that the differences in opinions between them were even greater than 
those between their parties. Once the agreement was concluded they 
have defended the reform through thick and thin. So one of my 
recommendations is - have luck! 
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To sum up, perhaps the most important thing for a successful pension 
reform is that it helps as far as possible to create social positive 
incentives. This is because pensions play such a large part in all 
modern economies. 
 
If you think that work should be encouraged and that tax wedges 
weaken the will to work, you must try to reduce the wedges. And it is 
then not a good idea to punish those who work for many years and 
reward those who have a short working career. If you believe that 
people’s decisions are based on knowledge about the economic 
consequences of early and late retirement, you should make sure that 
they are given the necessary information in good time before 
retirement. If you think that prosperity is created by private enterprise, 
you should make sure that a majority of the people have an immediate 
interest in successful companies. If you believe that social cohesion is 
good for the country, you should choose a form of indexation that 
follows wage trends. 
 
What we do with our pensions is very important, but what they do to 
us is even more important!  
 
 
 